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ONLY  WHERE  JUSTIFIED:  TOWARD  LIMITS  AND
EXPLANATORY  REQUIREMENTS  FOR
NATIONWIDE  INJUNCTIONS
Milan D. Smith, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
As this Article is submitted to the editors, at least eight cases are cur-
rently pending before the Ninth Circuit involving the propriety of a nation-
wide injunction.1  In my almost fourteen years on the bench, I have never
before seen nationwide injunctions handed down with the frequency that I
© 2020 Milan D. Smith, Jr.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  I thank my law
clerk, Marina Cassio, for her valuable assistance and scholarship in the preparation of this
Article.  The views expressed are mine alone and do not represent the views of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
1 See Doe 1 v. Trump, 418 F. Supp. 3d 573 (D. Or.), stay denied, 944 F.3d 1222 (9th
Cir. 2019); Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 1191 (E.D. Wash.
2019), stay granted sub nom. City & County of San Francisco v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigra-
tion Servs., 944 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2019); E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 385 F. Supp.
3d 922 (N.D. Cal. 2019), stay granted in part, 934 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2019) (in full disclo-
sure, I sat on the motions panel that issued this decision), and stay granted in full, 140 S. Ct.
3 (2019) (mem.), and argued, No. 19-16487 (9th Cir. Dec. 2, 2019); Innovation Law Lab v.
Nielsen, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2019), stay granted sub nom. Innovation Law Lab v.
McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 2019), and stay granted in part, denied in part sub nom.
Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 986 (9th Cir.), and aff’d sub nom. Innovation Law Lab
v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2020), and stay granted pending cert. sub nom. Wolf v. Innova-
tion Law Lab, No. 19A960, 2020 WL 1161432 (U.S. Mar. 11, 2020) (mem.); E. Bay Sanctu-
ary Covenant v. Trump, 349 F. Supp. 3d 838 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (temporary restraining
order), stay denied, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2018), and stay denied pending appeal,
932 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2018), and stay denied, 139 S. Ct. 782 (2018), and aff’d, 950 F.3d 1242
(9th Cir. 2020); City & County of San Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924 (N.D. Cal.
2018) (entering permanent injunction but staying decision pending appeal), appeal dock-
eted, No. 18-17308 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2018); Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D.
Cal. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-16981 (9th Cir. Oct. 12, 2018); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1049–50 (N.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d, 908
F.3d 476, 520 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019) (mem.).  I count in this
number those cases still on the Ninth Circuit’s docket despite issuance of a final decision,
such as due to pending U.S. Supreme Court activity.
2013
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see now.  Commentators have taken notice.2  Supreme Court Justices have
taken notice.3  Members of Congress have taken notice.4
I use the term “nationwide injunction” as shorthand for a specific phe-
nomenon: federal district court orders enjoining the federal government
from implementing a particular executive policy, anywhere, and with regard
to anyone in the nation.5  It is these injunctions that have attracted so much
critical attention lately.  And it is also these injunctions that have attracted my
interest as I have considered a plethora of such orders coming before the
Ninth Circuit.  I believe that identifying this limited category of interest helps
point the way toward remedies that sweep no more broadly than the problem
they are actually trying to solve.
Thus, I enter the already cacophonous nationwide injunction conversa-
tion with the aim of adding some nuance.  Not all nationwide injunctions are
created equal.  For instance, a nationwide injunction may be better justified
in protecting a single plaintiff suffering an injury with nationwide causes
2 See, e.g., Spencer E. Amdur & David Hausman, Response, Nationwide Injunctions and
Nationwide Harm, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 49 (2017); Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors:
Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417 (2017); Zachary D. Clopton,
National Injunctions and Preclusion, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2019); Amanda Frost, In Defense of
Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065 (2018); Michael T. Morley, Nationwide Injunc-
tions, Rule 23(B)(2), and the Remedial Powers of the Lower Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615 (2017);
Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. 920 (2020);
Alan M. Trammell, Demystifying Nationwide Injunctions, 98 TEX. L. REV. 67 (2019).
3 See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 599–601 (2020) (mem.)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in the grant of the stay) (Thomas, J., joining in concurrence)
(criticizing the “increasingly common practice of trial courts ordering relief that tran-
scends the cases before them,” and calling for the Court to confront “underlying equitable
and constitutional questions” at an appropriate juncture); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct.
2392, 2424–25 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (observing that “[i]njunctions that pro-
hibit the Executive Branch from applying a law or policy against anyone—often called
‘universal’ or ‘nationwide’ injunctions—have become increasingly common,” expressing
“skeptic[ism] that district courts have the authority” to issue them, and calling for the
Court to “address their legality”); see also Wolf v. Cook County, 140 S. Ct. 681, 681–84
(2020) (mem.) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from the grant of stay) (acknowledging Justices
Thomas and Gorsuch’s expressed concerns with nationwide injunctions, while criticizing
the Court for granting emergency stays even of more limited injunctions).
4 See, e.g., Nationwide Injunction Abuse Prevention Act of 2019, H.R. 4292, 116th
Cong. (2019); Rule by District Judge: The Challenges of Universal Injunctions: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2020).
5 It is often noted that the remarkable thing about a nationwide injunction is not
actually its geographical scope but is instead its extension beyond protection of just the
individual plaintiff. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 2, at 1067 (highlighting injunctions that
“bar[ ] the executive from enforcing federal laws and policies against anyone, not just the
plaintiffs in the case before them”).  I would argue that this framing misses two aspects of
the phenomenon: (1) the geographic scope of the order is also of concern, not so much
with regard to Article III as with regard to prudential concerns and comity, owing to its
impact on percolation of legal issues through multiple lower courts; and (2) the plaintiff
seeking the injunction is sometimes not actually subject to enforcement of the challenged
executive action at all, making the protection offered by the injunction entirely about non-
parties as a direct matter, with the plaintiff protected only indirectly.
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rather than in protecting numerous individuals suffering the same injury
nationwide, or likewise in protecting a plaintiff directly harmed by the chal-
lenged action rather than one indirectly harmed by the harm directly
impacting others.
Ultimately, I argue that nationwide injunctions are justified in certain
contexts, and in those contexts are within the Article III powers of a court
sitting in equity.  Actual practice has gone considerably further, however,
than the circumstances I would endorse.  In particular, I argue that current
law and practice underprioritizes percolation of important legal questions
across multiple circuits, awards relief to organizational plaintiffs with dubious
standing and/or equitable right to obtain it, and inappropriately relies on
assumptions about injuries to nonparties.  It is time for courts to declare
rules that more narrowly constrain the issuance of nationwide injunctive
relief.  At a minimum, we should ask district courts to provide a more rigor-
ous explanation of the propriety of nationwide scope.
In Part I of this Article, I discuss the existing law and current debates
surrounding nationwide injunctions.  I consider the origins of both the
apparent recent surge in the issuance of nationwide injunctions and the
apparent recent surge in skepticism concerning nationwide injunctions.  In
Part II, I analyze the potential justification for issuance of a nationwide
injunction that I find most compelling, and on which basis I argue a court is
well within the bounds of Article III notwithstanding the indirect benefits of
such injunction to nonparties.  In Part III, I consider three other sometimes-
asserted justifications that I argue courts should rule are insufficient reasons
to grant nationwide injunctions, whether on Article III grounds or simply as a
prudential matter.  In Part IV, I analyze two problems with nationwide injunc-
tions that I find particularly problematic.  I argue that these problems, in
combination with numerous other disadvantages of nationwide injunctions
noted by other commentators, should move courts to attempt reforms aimed
at limiting the circumstances under which nationwide injunctions may be
issued.  In Part V, I discuss potential reform ideas.  I conclude that both sub-
stantive limits and certain procedural requirements would help limit the issu-
ance of nationwide injunctions to cases in which they are truly justified.
I. CONTEXT
Nationwide injunctions are not new, although there is serious scholarly
debate about how old they are.6  Before the recent surge in nationwide
6 See, e.g., Bray, supra note 2, at 437 (dating nationwide injunctions to 1963); Sohoni,
supra note 2, at 924–26 (arguing that nationwide injunctions involve equitable powers dat-
ing at least to the early twentieth century); Samuel Bray, Response to The Lost History of the
“Universal” Injunction, REASON (Oct. 6, 2019), https://reason.com/2019/10/06/response-
to-the-lost-history-of-the-universal-injunction/#; Mila Sohoni, A Reply to Bray’s Response to
The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, YALE J. REG. (Oct. 10, 2019), https://
www.yalejreg.com/nc/a-reply-to-brays-response-to-the-lost-history-of-the-universal-injunc-
tion-by-mila-sohoni.
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injunctions against policies of President Trump’s administration,7 nation-
wide injunctions halted numerous policies under President Obama’s admin-
7 See supra note 1; see also, e.g., HIAS, Inc. v. Trump, 415 F. Supp. 3d 669, 679–87 (D.
Md. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-1160 (4th Cir. Feb. 13, 2020); New York v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), stay pending appeal denied, Nos. 19-
3591 & 19-3595, 2020 WL 95815 (2d Cir. Jan. 8, 2020), and stay granted, 140 S. Ct. 599
(2020) (mem.); Make the Road N.Y. v. Cuccinelli, 419 F. Supp. 3d 647 (S.D.N.Y 2019), stay
granted sub nom. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York,140 S. Ct. 599 (2020) (mem.); City of
Chicago v. Barr, 405 F. Supp. 3d 748 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (entering permanent injunction but
staying nationwide scope pending appeal), appeal docketed, No. 19-3290 (7th Cir. Nov. 19,
2019); New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d in part
and rev’d in part, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019); Pennsylvania v. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d 791,
830–35 (E.D. Pa.), aff’d sub nom., 930 F.3d 543, 576 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct.
918 (2020) (mem.); Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 145–46 (D.D.C. 2018), appeal
docketed sub nom. Grace v. Barr, No. 19-5013 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 9, 2019); City of Chicago v.
Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855 (E.D. Ill. 2018) (entering permanent injunction but staying
nationwide scope pending appeal); Stockman v. Trump, No. 17-1799, 2017 WL 9732572, at
*16 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2017), stay granted, 139 S. Ct. 950 (2019) (mem.), and vacated, No.
18-56539, 2019 WL 6125075, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 2019) (mem.); California v. Health &
Human Servs., 281 F. Supp. 3d 806, 832 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub
nom. California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 585 (9th Cir. 2018) (reducing nationwide scope to
state plaintiffs only); Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297, 2017 WL 6311305, at *10 (W.D.
Wash. Dec. 11, 2017), stay granted pending appeal, 139 S. Ct. 950 (2019) (mem.); Stone v.
Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747, 767–69 (D. Md. 2017), stay granted, No. 17-2459, 2019 WL
5697228 (D. Md. Mar. 7, 2019); Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 207–17 (D.D.C.
2017), vacated sub nom. Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 755 F. App’x 19, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per
curiam), concurring opinions filed at 917 F.3d 694 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Hawaii v. Trump, 265 F.
Supp. 3d 1140, 1160 (D. Haw. 2017) (temporary restraining order), stay granted in part, No.
17-17168, 2017 WL 5343014, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 13, 2017) (mem.), and stay granted in full,
138 S. Ct. 542, 542 (2017) (mem.), and aff’d, 878 F.3d 662, 702 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d, 138 S.
Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 951 (N.D. Ill. 2017)
(preliminary injunction), aff’d, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018), stayed as to nationwide scope,
No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir. June 26, 2018), vacated as moot, No. 17-2991, 2018
WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (en banc); Nw. Immigrant Rights Project v. Sessions,
No. C17-716, 2017 WL 3189032, at *7 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2017); County of Santa Clara v.
Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2017), appeal dismissed as moot, No. 17-16886,
2018 WL 1401847 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2018) (mem.); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v.
Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 565–66 (D. Md.), aff’d in relevant part, 857 F.3d 554, 605 (4th
Cir.) (en banc), stay granted in part by 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 (2017) (per curiam) (as to
foreign nationals lacking a bona fide relationship with an American person or entity), and
vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353, 353 (2017) (mem.); Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119,
1139–40 (D. Haw.) (temporary restraining order), converted to preliminary injunction, 245 F.
Supp. 3d 1227, 1237–39 (D. Haw.), and aff’d in relevant part, 859 F.3d 741, 789 (9th Cir.)
(per curiam), stay granted in part sub nom. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S.
Ct. 2080, 2089 (per curiam) (as to foreign nationals lacking a bona fide relationship with
an American person or entity), and vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 377, 377 (2017) (mem.);
Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141, 2017 WL 462040, at *2–3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017)
(temporary restraining order), stay denied, 847 F.3d 1151, 1169 (9th Cir. 2017) (per
curiam), superseded by Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017); Darweesh v.
Trump, No. 17 Civ. 480, 2017 WL 388504, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017).
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istration.8  Nationwide injunctions likewise plagued President George W.
Bush’s administration,9 President Clinton’s administration,10 and multiple
other administrations dating back at least to President Lyndon B. Johnson’s
administration.11  It appears, however, that the phenomenon has recently
increased by an order of magnitude.
A. Existing Law
Existing law is generally quite permissive regarding the issuance of
nationwide injunctions,12 which is to say that there is no law that squarely
regulates them (as I have defined them here) as a category.  Courts issuing
nationwide injunctions often cite Califano v. Yamasaki,13 a 1979 Supreme
Court decision reviewing a nationwide injunction issued in protection of a
8 See, e.g., In re Envtl. Prot. Agency, 803 F.3d 804, 808–09 (6th Cir. 2015), order vacated
sub nom. In re U.S. Dep’t of Def., 713 F. App’x 489 (6th Cir. 2018); Franciscan All., Inc. v.
Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 696 (N.D. Tex. 2016), stay denied, No. 7:16-cv-00108, 2017 WL
2964088, at *5–6 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2017); Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d
520, 534 (E.D. Tex. 2016), stay denied, 227 F. Supp. 3d 696, 698 (E.D. Tex. 2017); Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Perez, No. 5:16-cv-00066, 2016 WL 3766121, at *46 (N.D. Tex. June
27, 2016); Associated Builders & Contractors of Se. Tex. v. Rung, No. 1:16-cv-425, 2016 WL
8188655, at *15 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2016); Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 136 F.
Supp. 3d 1317, 1354 n.52 (D. Wyo. 2015), vacated sub nom. Wyoming v. Sierra Club, No. 15-
8134, 2016 WL 3853806, at *1 (10th Cir. July 13, 2016) (mem.); Texas v. United States, 201
F. Supp. 3d 810, 836 (N.D. Tex. 2016); Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677–78
(S.D. Tex.) (enjoining parts of DACA and DAPA), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015),
aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam); Sequoia
Forestkeeper v. Tidwell, 847 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1253 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
9 See, e.g., Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Nos. C 05-1144, C 04-
4512, 2007 WL 1970096, at *19 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2007); California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., 468 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1144, 1149 (N.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d, 575 F.3d 999,
1005 (9th Cir. 2009); Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, No. CIV F-03-6386, 2005 WL
5280466, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2005), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 490 F.3d 687, 699
(9th Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488,
501 (2009) (declining to reach the question whether “a nationwide injunction would be
appropriate”); Am. Lands All. v. Norton, No. Civ.A. 00-2339, 2004 WL 3246687, at *3
(D.D.C. June 2, 2004).
10 See, e.g., Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1408–10
(D.C. Cir. 1998); Heartwood, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 73 F. Supp. 2d 962, 977–80 (S.D. Ill.
1999); Am. Mining Cong. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 962 F. Supp. 2, 5 (D.D.C. 1997).
11 See, e.g., Bresgal v. Brock, 637 F. Supp. 280, 282–84 (D. Or. 1986), aff’d in part and
modified in part, 843 F.2d 1163, 1168–72 (9th Cir. 1987); McDonald v. McLucas, 371 F.
Supp. 831, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, 419 U.S. 987 (1974) (mem.); Harlem Valley Transp.
Ass’n v. Stafford, 360 F. Supp. 1057, 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 500 F.2d 328, 332–37 (2d
Cir. 1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 89–90 (1968) (acknowledging that injunctive relief
sought by plaintiffs was not limited to New York City, casting no doubt on the propriety of
such scope); Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 518, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Washington, J.,
Supplemental Opinion).
12 See Bray, supra note 2, at 444 (“There is no rule against national injunctions; nor is
there a rule requiring them.”).
13 442 U.S. 682 (1979).
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certified nationwide class, for two propositions: “[I]njunctive relief should be
no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete
relief to the plaintiffs. . . .  [T]he scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the
extent of the violation established, not by the geographical extent of the
plaintiff class.”14
These propositions are somewhat in tension, as the “violation estab-
lished” may exceed the scope of the violation that must be enjoined to afford
the plaintiff “complete relief.”  In any event, the “complete relief” proposi-
tion appears to be used as often to widen the scope of relief as to narrow it.15
Moreover, when district courts grant nationwide injunctions, those deci-
sions are reviewed deferentially for abuse of discretion.16  Thus, a three-judge
appellate panel is limited in the extent to which it can reevaluate the equities
of a nationwide injunction absent clear legal standards by which the district
court failed to abide.  Even if an appellate court ultimately acts to stay or
vacate a nationwide injunction improvidently granted, that injunction binds
the federal government in the interim and brings its policy to a halt.
A defining feature of an injunction is that it is enforceable through con-
tempt proceedings.17  Federal officials who violate an injunction—even if an
appeal is pending and even if the government ultimately prevails in the
appeal or in a final decision by the district court—are at personal risk of
criminal sanctions.18  Both the original plaintiffs and nonparties alike may
bring contempt proceedings if they are beneficiaries of the injunction,19 and
nationwide injunctions are apt to have numerous beneficiaries.
14 Id. at 702.
15 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 930 F.3d 543, 576 (3d Cir. 2019), cert.
granted, 140 S. Ct. 918 (2020) (mem.); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Home-
land Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 512 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019) (mem.),
argued, No. 15-587 (Nov. 12, 2019); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d
554, 605 (4th Cir.), stayed in part by 137 S. Ct. 2080 (per curiam), and vacated and remanded,
138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.).
16 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2962 (3d
ed., 1999).
17 Id. § 2960.
18 Id.  For a recent instance of civil and criminal contempt proceedings against a gov-
ernment official, see United States v. Arpaio, 951 F.3d 1001, 1003–04 (9th Cir. 2020)
(describing contempt convictions for violation of injunction issued in Ortega-Melendres v.
Arpaio, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959, 992–93 (D. Ariz. 2011), aff’d, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir.
2012)).
19 See FED. R. CIV. P. 71 (“When an order grants relief for a nonparty . . . , the proce-
dure for enforcing the order is the same as for a party.”); 12 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16,
§ 3032.  The enforceability of an injunction by nonparties dates back at least to the nine-
teenth century. See, e.g., Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co. v. Chi. & Atl. Ry. Co., 44 F. 653, 659
(C.C.D. Ind. 1890) (“Every person not being a party in any cause, . . . in[ ] whose favor an
order shall have been made, shall be enabled to enforce obedience to such order by the
same process as if he were a party to the cause . . . .” (quoting FED. EQUITY R. 10, 42 U.S. (1
How.) xxxix, xliv (1843) (superseded 1912), cited in FED. R. CIV. P. 71 advisory committee
note (1937))).
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Nationwide injunctions therefore differ in an important way from
noninjunctive court decisions regarding the lawfulness or constitutionality of
a federal policy.20  A noninjunctive district court decision that a federal pol-
icy is unlawful or unconstitutional in the context (for example) of a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claim for damages, a defense against enforcement of the policy, or a
declaratory judgment has no precedential effect even within the same dis-
trict21 and no preclusive effect on the federal government except with regard
to the parties to that same case.22  This is true even if the district court’s
holding is that the policy is unconstitutional on its face.23  A court may
expect or hope, as a practical matter, that federal defendants will alter their
behavior promptly in response to the court’s ruling,24 but this is not the same
as legally requiring as much.25
20 See 33 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 8301–09
(2d ed. 1996) (canvassing types of cases that may result in a judicial decision that an agency
action is unlawful or unconstitutional).
21 See, e.g., In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (“Binding precedent for all is set only by the Supreme Court, and for the district
courts within a circuit, only by the court of appeals for that circuit.”), aff’d sub nom. Chan v.
Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 135 (1989).
22 United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984).
23 I note, however, that some debate exists regarding the propriety of facial invalida-
tion even outside the injunction context. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial
Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1321–23 (2000).
Additionally, doctrines exist to discourage invalidity rulings in the declaratory judg-
ment context, where findings of unlawfulness may be less tethered to specific applications
to the plaintiffs. See 10B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2763 (4th ed. 2016); see also, e.g., Cole v. McClellan, 439 F.2d 534, 535–36 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (per curiam) (declining to grant declaratory relief absent “a showing of need arising
out of immediate threats to constitutional rights”).
24 See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 1785.2; see also, e.g., Stanton v. Bd. of Educ., R
581 F. Supp. 190, 195 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (“[T]he defendants are responsible public officials,
and it can be assumed without anxiety that any determination favoring named plaintiffs
will apply to all persons similarly situated.” (quoting Domingo v. Toia, No. 77-cv-217, slip
op. at 4 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 1977) (Foley, J.))).  However, government actors do not always
modify their behavior vis-a`-vis nonparties absent an order enforceable by those nonparties.
See, e.g., Bizjak v. Blum, 490 F. Supp. 1297, 1301 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (certifying class “[i]n light
of the defendants’ history of noncompliance”). See generally Allan D. Vestal, Relitigation by
Federal Agencies: Conflict, Concurrence and Synthesis of Judicial Policies, 55 N.C. L. REV. 123
(1977) (discussing agency practice of continuing to defend regulations held unlawful on a
circuit-by-circuit basis), cited in Bray, supra note 2, at 444 n.160.
25 Professor Bray attributes the idea that courts should issue injunctions requiring
across-the-board compliance with their rulings to two Judge Friendly opinions issued in
1973.  Bray, supra note 2, at 441 (first citing Vulcan Soc’y of the N.Y.C. Fire Dep’t, Inc. v.
Civil Serv. Comm’n, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973); and then citing Galvan v. Levine, 490
F.2d 1255, 1257 (2d Cir. 1973)).  Professor Bray reads these opinions to technically con-
clude only that the practical effect of a decision of unconstitutionality in a case involving
individual (nonclass) plaintiffs would be the government defendants’ acquiescence to that
ruling with regard to all similarly situated individuals. Id. at 442–43.  Professor Bray sug-
gests that later courts’ misreading of Judge Friendly as speaking to the legal effect of the
decisions led to the assumption that courts should issue universal injunctions against the
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B. Ongoing Debates
The rise of the nationwide injunction begs the question: Is the underly-
ing trend more that the judiciary is aggrandizing itself with power to declare
national policy that should belong to the executive?26  Or is it that the execu-
tive is aggrandizing itself with power to declare national policy that should
belong to the legislature?27  Of course, not all nationwide injunctions are
issued on the basis of a separation-of-powers violation.  Often the announced
violations sound in individual liberties, statutory interpretation, or adminis-
trative procedure.  Yet even these issues contain a separation-of-powers ele-
ment.  The separation of powers under our Constitution is designed to
safeguard individual liberties28—the improper assumption of too much
power by one branch puts those liberties in jeopardy.  Likewise, when the
executive branch exceeds statutory authority or sidesteps administrative pro-
cedural requirements, it is exceeding the constraints which it is the legislative
branch’s prerogative to create.
To the extent the rise in nationwide injunctions simply reflects a rise in
unlawful executive actions, one might think that there is no cause for con-
cern regarding judicial overreach.  And yet the nationwide injunction poses
unique problems for the judiciary and often mires courts in questions they
are ill suited to answer.  It is perhaps not surprising, then, that nationwide
injunctions are currently the subject of a vigorous scholarly debate.
For instance, one academic battlefield concerns the historical origins of
nationwide injunctions as a matter of equity, and thus the power of federal
district courts under Article III, properly construed, to issue them.  Perhaps
most prominently, Professor Bray argues that nationwide injunctions are
incompatible with the historical powers of a federal district court sitting in
equity.29  He dates the first nationwide injunction to 1963,30 citing this late
emergence as evidence of a lack of constitutional authority.  He argues that
that two shifts in jurisprudential philosophy, combined with “renewed judi-
cial confidence” in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education, created the condi-
tions from which nationwide injunctions emerged: (1) a shift from
policies deemed unconstitutional. Id. (citing McDonald v. McLucas, 371 F. Supp. 831
(S.D.N.Y. 1974)).
26 See, e.g., Bray, supra note 2, at 445.
27 See, e.g., Frost, supra note 2, at 1119; Robert L. Glicksman & Emily Hammond, The
Administrative Law of Regulatory Slop and Strategy, 68 DUKE L.J. 1651, 1694–1707 (2019).
28 See Antonin Scalia, Foreword: The Importance of Structure in Constitutional Interpretation,
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1417, 1418 (2008).
29 Bray, supra note 2, at 425–27.  Professor Bray’s article appears to have formed the
basis for Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Trump v. Hawaii, in which Justice Thomas urged
the Court to “address the[ ] legality” of nationwide injunctions should “their popularity
continue[ ].”  138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring); see id. at 2427 (citing
Bray, supra note 2, at 425); see also Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599,
599–601 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the grant of the stay) (citing Bray, supra note
2, at 471–72).
30 Bray, supra note 2, at 437 (citing Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir.
1963)).
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conceptualizing suits against federal officers as suits to prevent enforcement
of a policy in a particular case to conceptualizing them as suits against the
policy itself; and (2) a shift from conceptualizing judicial holdings that a pol-
icy could not be enforced as holdings that a higher law controlled to concep-
tualizing them as holdings “striking down” the challenged law.31  He
contends that federal courts should adopt a rule that injunctions protect only
the plaintiff, meaning that they extend no further than such relief as the
plaintiff would have standing to enforce in contempt proceedings.32
By contrast, Professor Sohoni argues that numerous cases from the early
twentieth century demonstrate that Article III is not an absolute bar to
nationwide injunctions.33  She analyzes several injunctions against the
enforcement of federal statutes, state statutes, and even a federal administra-
tive action, which she claims demonstrate the exercise of all powers necessary
for issuance of a nationwide injunction.  She concludes that many current
reform proposals would undercut these long-established exercises of judicial
authority outside of the currently contentious context, and that the particu-
lar reform proposal of judicially narrowing Article III is not historically
supported.34
The proper interpretation of Article III, in light of historical orders
handed down by federal district courts sitting in equity, is beyond the scope
of this Article.  My concerns35 and proposals36 sound primarily in prudential
and equitable considerations.  To the extent that nationwide injunctions
under current law and practice raise genuine Article III concerns, however, I
do not believe that they would do so if limited in the ways I propose here.37
Another area of contention in the scholarly literature is the relationship
between nationwide injunctions and offensive nonmutual preclusion.38  Pro-
fessor Morley argues that nationwide injunctions are in sharp tension with
the considerations underlying the Supreme Court’s decision in United States
v. Mendoza.39 Mendoza held that the Court’s relatively recent erosion of the
mutuality requirement for issue preclusion should not extend to cases in
which the federal government is the defendant.40  The Court reasoned that
the federal government is involved in a uniquely massive number of lawsuits
which often raise the same questions, that percolation of the answers to these
31 Id. at 445, 449–52.
32 Id. at 469.
33 Sohoni, supra note 2, at 924–28, 1008–09.
34 Professor Bray and Professor Sohoni have continued to debate the relevant history.
See supra note 6.
35 See infra Parts III and IV.
36 See infra Part V.
37 See infra note 66 and accompanying text. R
38 Offensive nonmutual preclusion occurs when a plaintiff estops a defendant from
relitigating an issue on which the defendant previously lost in a different case, involving a
different plaintiff. See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 4464.
39 See Morley, supra note 2, at 627–33 (citing United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154
(1984)).
40 Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 158.
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questions through multiple lower courts is ultimately beneficial, that govern-
ment resources should be preserved from having to appeal every case, and
that subsequent administrations should be able to relitigate the same ques-
tions on different grounds.41  Professor Morley argues that Mendoza is
grounded in a more comprehensive analysis of the federal judicial system
than Califano, and that the law governing nationwide injunctions should be
modified to comply with Mendoza’s limits.42  Specifically, Professor Morley
would limit nationwide injunctions to cases in which district courts certify a
nationwide class, and would limit nationwide class certification primarily to
cases in which the Supreme Court has already spoken unambiguously to the
relevant legal issue.43
Professor Trammell similarly argues that general preclusion principles
should be applied to nationwide injunctions in such a way as to limit the
circumstances under which they are issued relative to current practice.44
Professor Trammell suggests that nationwide injunctions are appropriate
when the federal government has acted in bad faith, which occurs most
unambiguously where federal officials refuse to abide by settled law.
In contrast, Professor Clopton argues that it is Mendoza that merits
rethinking and advocates an analysis that focuses more on potential plaintiffs
than the defendant.45  He argues that district courts considering issuing a
nationwide injunction should employ Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore’s46 concept
of deserving nonparties.  In the absence of deserving nonparties, nationwide
injunctive relief would generally be limited to successfully certified class
actions.  In defense of district courts’ Article III power to issue nationwide
injunctions, Professor Clopton claims that, while district court decisions lack
precedential effect, their judgments are entitled to full faith and credit.  He
traces the apparent lack of nationwide injunctions throughout much of the
country’s history more to the contemporary lack of nonmutual preclusion
than contemporary understandings of the courts’ powers in equity.47
Although I agree with Professor Clopton that Mendoza and Califano are
not wholly incompatible, I agree with Professor Morley that some of Men-
doza’s policy reasoning ought to be applied to nationwide injunctions as well.
I consider this issue in Section IV.A.
Most pertinent to my own evaluation of the nationwide injunction is the
normative battlefield regarding whether, and in what circumstances, courts
ought to issue nationwide injunctions.  The existing arguments in this sphere
41 Id. at 159–62.
42 Morley, supra note 2, at 633.
43 See id. at 620–21, 656–57.
44 Trammell, supra note 2, at 103–05.
45 Clopton, supra note 2, at 5–6, 39–42.
46 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (“The general rule should be that in cases where a plaintiff
could easily have joined in the earlier action or where . . . the application of offensive
estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge should not allow the use of offensive
collateral estoppel.”).
47 Clopton, supra note 2, at 15–17.
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are well canvassed by Professor Frost.  Professor Frost argues that nationwide
injunctions are within district courts’ equitable powers but should not be a
default remedy.48  She argues that nationwide injunctions are an appropriate
remedy in three instances: (1) when necessary to provide complete relief to
the parties; (2) when necessary to prevent irreparable injury to nonparties
similarly situated; and (3) when an injunction of more limited scope would
be impracticable to administer.49  By contrast, she contends that uniformity
of federal law is not a sufficient reason by itself to issue a nationwide injunc-
tion, as it is counterbalanced by the benefits of percolation amongst multiple
lower courts before the Supreme Court ultimately resolves the pending
issue.50  She acknowledges that the availability of nationwide injunctions cre-
ates certain perverse incentives, including forum shopping, wait-and-see
plaintiff behavior, and bypassing class certification requirements.51  She
advocates for a special scope hearing to be held by any district court consid-
ering issuance of a nationwide injunction, at which all the costs and benefits
of nationwide scope can be appropriately weighed.52
I agree with Professor Frost that nationwide injunctions may sometimes
be justified even though they should never be the default remedy.  However,
I disagree with Professor Frost regarding precisely which circumstances justify
a nationwide injunction.53
In the remaining sections I engage substantively with the existing schol-
arly debate.  I first close this Section, however, with a metaobservation: The
reason that nationwide injunctions have drawn such intense critical attention
recently likely has little to do with some of the formal concerns typically
articulated by commentators (e.g., the historical nature of equity, preclusion
doctrine, class certification requirements).  Instead, the reason is likely a per-
ception that major battles over national policy are now being fought not
between parties in Congress, but between the executive and the judiciary.54
48 Frost, supra note 2, at 1069.
49 Id. at 1090.
50 Id. at 1101–03.
51 Id. at 1104–06, 1114–15.
52 Id. at 1116.
53 See infra Part III.
54 The reason nationwide injunctions are drawing so much critical attention now is
likely because President Trump and the Department of Justice have made it a cause ce´le`bre.
See Tessa Berenson, Inside the Trump Administration’s Fight to End Nationwide Injunctions,
TIME (Nov. 4, 2019), https://time.com/5717541/nationwide-injunctions-trump-adminis-
tration (“Members of the Trump administration have made it a mission at the highest
levels of the White House and the Justice Department to put an end to nationwide injunc-
tions.”); see also, e.g., Alison Frankel, AG Barr Joins Renewed Trump Administration Push to
Curtail Nationwide Injunctions, REUTERS (May 22, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-otc-injunctions/ag-barr-joins-renewed-trump-administration-push-to-curtail-nationwide-
injunctions-idUSKCN1SS2U4 (“‘One judge can, in effect, cancel . . . policy with the stroke
of the pen,’ Barr said. ‘No official in the United States government can exercise that kind
of nationwide power, with the sole exception of the president. And the Constitution sub-
jects him to nationwide election, among other constitutional checks, as a prerequisite to
wielding that power.’” (alteration in original)); Sarah N. Lynch, Attorney General Vows to
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The judiciary is not meant to be political, and yet the judiciary is often seen
as political when it checks a political decision by the executive.
The question of the proper role of the judiciary is older than the judici-
ary itself.  Reasonable minds may disagree about whether federal courts
ought to be engaged in law declaration in addition to dispute resolution, as
well as which model actually dominates in practice.55  Judges are unelected
officials who should not be solving generalized grievances or making major
policy choices that belong to the people.  The nationwide injunction appears
to be a vehicle by which judges may exercise a great deal of power to shape
national policy.  Therein lies the real crux of the concern, and therein lies
the commensurate outcry by some against an overreaching judiciary.
II. BEST JUSTIFICATION: COMPLETE RELIEF FOR THE PLAINTIFF
The potential justification for nationwide injunctions that I find most
compelling as an equitable consideration is the provision of complete relief
to the plaintiff.56  In the classic case where we are talking about an individual
harmed by an executive policy,57 a successful case on the merits often entitles
the plaintiff to no less.  Imagine a fisherman whose livelihood is imperiled by
an invalid order that allows pollution of the watershed.58  Enjoining imple-
mentation of the order, even if limited to the watershed encompassing the
plaintiff’s fishery, might benefit numerous nonparties, including other fisher-
men, environmentalists, recreational enthusiasts, drinking water consumers,
and agricultural irrigation water users.  The fact that the injunction would
benefit nonparties does not diminish its validity as a remedy for the actual
plaintiff.  Nor would the geographic scope of the injunction affect its valid-
Fight Nationwide Court Injunctions, REUTERS (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/us-usa-justice-courts/attorney-general-vows-to-fight-nationwide-court-injunctions-
idUSKCN1LT34A (reporting that Attorney General Sessions attacked a nationwide injunc-
tion against the administration’s first order restricting travel from seven majority-Muslim
countries by saying “I really am amazed that a judge sitting on an island in the Pacific can
issue an order that stops the president of the United States from what appears to be clearly
his statutory and constitutional power,” and argued that “[t]his trend must stop.  We have a
government to run.  The Constitution does not grant to a single district judge the power to
veto executive branch actions”).
Most of the scholarship on nationwide injunctions, and the only Supreme Court opin-
ions (minority concurrences) questioning their validity writ large, has emerged in just the
past three or four years. See supra notes 2–3.  For one exception, see Daniel J. Walker,
Note, Administrative Injunctions: Assessing the Propriety of Non-Class Collective Relief, 90 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1119 (2005).  By contrast, the frequency of nationwide injunction issuance
appears to have been growing fairly steadily over several decades. See supra notes 7–11. R
55 See Frost, supra note 2, at 1087 & n.103.
56 See, e.g., id. at 1090–94.
57 I discuss the nontypical case, involving an organization only indirectly affected by a
challenged policy, in Section IV.B.
58 My hypothetical here is loosely inspired by Yurok Tribe v. United States Bureau of Recla-
mation, 231 F. Supp. 3d 450 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
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ity,59 if the relevant watershed extended as far.  Imagine a Gulf of Mexico
fishery impacted by an order affecting pollution of the Mississippi River
basin, which includes all or parts of thirty-two states within the jurisdiction of
ten different federal circuit courts.
The exercise of the court’s equitable powers in this scenario is not mean-
ingfully different from a nuisance case between private parties.60  If an indi-
vidual plaintiff, privately injured by a public nuisance, successfully sues to
enjoin the nuisance, the court’s order is no less valid by virtue of its beneficial
impact on nonparties also in the vicinity of the nuisance.  Nor is it any less
valid on account of those nonparties living across a state border, or even on
account of the defendant needing to take action across the state border in
order to abate the nuisance.61
Cases involving nationwide funds provide another example of where
complete relief for the plaintiff arguably requires a nationwide injunction.
For example, in Washington v. Reno, the Sixth Circuit reviewed a district
court’s nationwide preliminary injunction regarding telephone systems in
federal prisons.62  The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) was in the process of replac-
ing its collect call system, under which inmates could make unlimited collect
calls, with a direct-dial system, under which inmates were limited to twenty
approved call recipients, were blocked from calling elected officials or the
media, and had to purchase advance credits for their calls.  To pay for the
installation of the new phone system, the BOP was using money from a trust
fund statutorily established for the benefit of inmates’ general welfare.
Without certifying a class of affected inmates, the district court entered a
preliminary injunction requiring the BOP, among other things, to cease
implementing the direct-dial system unless the collect call system remained
available, and to cease using money from the trust fund to install the direct-
dial system.  On appeal, the Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction against fur-
ther installation of the direct-dial system, ruling against plaintiffs on the mer-
its of their First Amendment, due process, and Administrative Procedure Act
challenges.63  The Sixth Circuit further held that the installation of a phone
system could be reasonably viewed as benefitting the inmate population.64  It
nevertheless affirmed the issuance of a nationwide preliminary injunction
enjoining the use of trust-fund moneys for aspects of the new direct-dial sys-
tem purchased primarily for security purposes (e.g., monitoring equipment).
As to this “limited” form of relief, the Sixth Circuit further affirmed the dis-
59 The geographic scope may be relevant to the balance of equities, however, as dis-
cussed below.
60 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2427 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 564 (1851)).
61 See, e.g., The Salton Sea Cases, 172 F. 792, 812–16 (9th Cir. 1909) (injunction
designed to prevent defendant from flooding plaintiff’s land in California ultimately
required defendant to fix a faulty irrigation canal in Mexico).
62 Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1095–96 (6th Cir. 1994).
63 Id. at 1099–1100, 1104.  This was largely because the court concluded that those
challenges had been assuaged by the Bureau’s intervening regulatory changes.
64 Id. at 1102.
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trict court’s nationwide scope.65  The court concluded that, since the trust
fund was a nationwide fund, the plaintiffs would be just as injured by deple-
tions of the fund attributable to improper expenditures at other prisons as at
the facility where the plaintiffs themselves were incarcerated.
The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning regarding complete relief was reasonable.
I do not believe that its decision, grounded in affording complete relief to
the plaintiffs, raises the Article III concerns typically articulated regarding
nationwide injunctions.  As long as a court has subject matter jurisdiction
over the case (which includes a plaintiff with standing) and personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant, Article III does not prevent the court from
enjoining the defendant’s conduct in a way that happens to benefit nonpar-
ties or that reaches beyond the court’s geographic territory.66
Nevertheless, a court sitting in equity has discretion to tailor the remedy
to which the plaintiff is entitled, and may elect not to provide the plaintiff
with the “complete” relief prayed for if other equitable considerations move
the court to narrow or deny the requested remedy.  The Supreme Court in
Califano v. Yamasaki stated only that “injunctive relief should be no more bur-
densome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the
plaintiffs.”67  It does not necessarily follow that courts must issue injunctive
relief that provides complete relief to the plaintiffs.  The balance of the equi-
ties may indicate otherwise.
For instance, the Sixth Circuit might have concluded in Washington that
the balance of the equities between plaintiffs, whose only cognizable injury in
the end was the loss of funds for recreational equipment and the like, and
defendants, who would become subject to contempt proceedings based on
the vague standard of whether their purchases were “primarily” for security
purposes rather than general welfare purposes, supported defendants.  In my
hypothetical about the Gulf of Mexico fishery, the court might conclude that
the balance of the equities between the plaintiff, who stood to suffer the eco-
nomic injury of loss of the fishery, and the thirty-two states’ worth of individu-
als and entities who stood to suffer economic losses if the injunction were
issued, particularly in a case where the regulation’s deficiencies appeared
curable,68 supported defendants.
Thus, I contend that nationwide injunctions are constitutionally permis-
sible in cases where they are necessary to afford complete relief to the plain-
tiff, but that they are never required.
III. INSUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATIONS
A. Protection of Similarly Situated Nonparties
Another purported justification for nationwide injunctions is the protec-
tion of individuals who cannot quickly bring their own legal challenges and
65 Id. at 1103–04.
66 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2945. R
67 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (emphasis added).
68 See infra note 87.
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who would otherwise suffer irreparable harm.69  I believe that this rationale
invites judicial overreach.
When a court includes within an injunction relief designed solely to pro-
tect nonparties, it adjudicates a case or controversy that is not before it.  It
denies the federal government an opportunity to litigate against those other
individuals or entities, and it denies the federal defendant fair notice of their
injuries.  Its coercive ordering of executive officials to do or not do some-
thing, divorced from the relief that the actual plaintiff has standing to assert,
raises serious separation-of-powers concerns.
The argument in favor of expressly protecting nonparties for their own
sake sounds in justice and the public interest.  It resonates with the consider-
ation of the public interest now long baked into the federal tests for issuance
of a preliminary or permanent injunction.70  Particularly in the instance of a
disadvantaged group widely suffering a lack of access to the courts, it is
understandable to wish that courts could reach out and protect that group
without its members needing to bring a great multitude of individual
challenges.
But Congress has designed a system to address this very problem: the
class action.  The class action is the modern descendant of the bill of peace
used by English courts in equity to enable “a portion of the parties in interest
to represent the entire body.”71  Now applicable in both law and equity,72
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 requires a court to make specific findings
before certifying a class.  It first provides, as prerequisites to any class certifi-
cation, that (1) the class must be “so numerous” that actual joinder is
“impracticable”; (2) the class must share common questions of law or fact;
(3) the representative parties must be asserting claims or defenses “typical” of
the class; and (4) the representative parties must “fairly and adequately” pro-
tect the class.73  It then limits the device further by providing that only three
types of class actions are permissible: (a) cases in which individual lawsuits
would either create incompatible standards for the defendant or be disposi-
tive of other potential class members’ rights anyway; (b) cases in which the
defendant “has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the
class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is
appropriate respecting the class as a whole”; or (c) cases in which common
questions of law or fact “predominate.”74
69 See, e.g., Nw. Immigrant Rights Project v. Sessions, No. C17-716, 2017 WL 3189032,
at *7 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2017) (“The Preliminary Injunction is granted on a nationwide
basis as to any other similarly situated non-profit organizations who, like NWIRP, self-iden-
tify and disclose their assistance on pro se filings.  Therefore, the Court prohibits the
enforcement of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(t) during the pendency of this preliminary injunction
on a nationwide basis.”); Frost, supra note 2, at 1094.
70 See infra note 117. R
71 Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 303 (1853).
72 For a summary of the relevant history, see 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 1751. R
73 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
74 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
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This intricate system is designed to protect both potential class members
and defendants.  Nationwide injunctions issued specifically to provide relief
to nonparties circumvent the Rule 23 requirements for issuing class-wide
relief.  The system is not without its flaws, which are beyond the scope of this
Article.  But efforts to help similarly situated individuals who cannot quickly
or easily get into court themselves should focus on reforms to the class-action
device itself, not on bolstering a nationwide-injunction rationale that evades
the design of the class action altogether.75
B. Nationwide Violation
Another purported justification sometimes asserted for a nationwide
injunction is the remediation of a nationwide violation.76  The argument to
which I refer is not that the plaintiff is suffering a nationwide harm, but that
the defendant’s conduct causing the plaintiff’s harm corresponds to a nation-
wide law or policy that the court has found unlawful.  Almost all federal laws
and policies are, by definition, nationwide in their application.  Accordingly,
this reason alone cannot justify the issuance of a nationwide injunction
against enforcement or implementation.
The oft-cited maxim from which this argument seems to derive is the
Califano statement that “the scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent
of the violation established.”77  The problem with reading this authority to
endorse broad findings of nationwide violations is that plaintiffs have stand-
ing to challenge only that conduct by which plaintiffs have personally suf-
fered a concrete injury.78  In light of Califano’s immediately preceding
mandate that injunctive relief be “no more burdensome to the defendant
than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs,”79 I believe
Califano is better read to support the proposition that the scope of injunctive
75 Given the different considerations applicable in review of an injunction that is lim-
ited in scope to a certified class, even if that class arguably extends “nationwide,” I do not
count such cases as “nationwide injunction” cases for purposes of this Article. See, e.g., Al
Otro Lado, Inc. v. McAleenan, No. 17-cv-02366, 2019 WL 6134601 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 19,
2019), appeal docketed sub nom. Al Otro Lado v. Wolf, No. 19-56417 (9th Cir. Dec. 5, 2019),
and stay denied, 952 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2020); Padilla v. Immigration & Customs Enforce-
ment, No. C18-928 (W.D. Wash. July 2, 2019), stayed in part, No. 19-35565 (9th Cir. July 22,
2019), argued, No. 19-35565 (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 2019); Gonzalez Rosario v. U.S. Citizenship
& Immigration Servs., 365 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (W.D. Wash. 2018), argued sub nom. Nw. Immi-
grant Rights Project v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., No. 18-35806 (9th Cir. Feb.
4, 2020); Inland Empire–Immigrant Youth Collective v. Nielsen, No. EDCV-17-2048, 2018
WL 1061408 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2018), appeal stayed, No. 18-55564 (9th Cir. Jun. 28, 2019).
76 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 951 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“This
injunction against imposition of the notice and access conditions is nationwide in scope,
there being no reason to think that the legal issues present in this case are restricted to
Chicago or that the statutory authority given to the Attorney General would differ in
another jurisdiction.”).
77 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979).
78 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–48 (2016).
79 Califano, 442 U.S. at 702.
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relief should match the scope of the violation established by the plaintiff with
regard to the plaintiff’s injuries.  The object of Califano’s extent-of-the-viola-
tion statement, in context, was to demonstrate that geography was not an
independent constraint.  Notably, Califano was decided in the context of a
certified nationwide class.  It had no occasion to speak to the question of
whether courts are competent to rule on violations as to nonparties in the
absence of class certification.
The nationwide violation argument inappropriately invites a single judge
to police the entire federal executive vis-a`-vis the entire public.  As articulated
in Mendoza,80 there are sound reasons to allow the executive to relitigate
important questions of national policy, and statutory and constitutional
interpretation.81
C. Administrative Procedure Act
Courts and commentators sometimes cite the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) as sufficiently justifying, or indeed compelling, the issuance of a
nationwide injunction in a case to which the APA applies.82  I argue that even
if the APA requires vacatur of an agency action, it does not necessarily follow
that it also requires an injunction.
As a preliminary matter, § 705 grants reviewing courts, “to the extent
necessary to prevent irreparable injury,” the authority “to postpone the effec-
tive date of an agency action or to preserve status or rights pending conclu-
sion of the review proceedings.”83  Section 705 appears to contemplate that
the rule itself will be postponed, not just the rule’s application to a specific
plaintiff.  On this understanding, it suggests a congressional thumb on the
scale opposite the executive’s frequently asserted interest in implementing
policy without delay.  However, it does not necessarily follow that an injunc-
tion should issue, which is traditionally a matter for the court’s equitable
80 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. R
81 Another version of this concept occurs in immigration cases where a court issues a
nationwide injunction on the basis of constitutional and statutory commands that immigra-
tion policy be uniform nationwide.  See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 511–12 (9th Cir. 2018) (“DACA is national immigration
policy, and an injunction that applies that policy to some individuals while rescinding it as
to others is inimical to the principle of uniformity.”), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019)
(mem.), argued, No. 18-587 (Nov. 12, 2019).  I am doubtful that this rationale is sound
either, as it is belied at least by the existence of circuit splits, intracircuit splits, and Board
of Immigration Appeals inconsistencies as a matter of course.
82 See, e.g., Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 699 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The
nationwide injunction, as applied to our decision to affirm the district court’s invalidation
of [the challenged regulations], is compelled by the text of the Administrative Procedure
Act.”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009).
I note that almost all executive action is subject to the APA. See, e.g., HIAS, Inc. v.
Trump, 415 F. Supp. 3d 669, 682–84 (D. Md. 2020) (concluding that even an executive
order case involves the APA given the joinder of defendant federal officials other than the
President), appeal docketed, No. 20-1160 (4th Cir. Feb. 13, 2020).
83 5 U.S.C. § 705 (2018).
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discretion.  A rule or order may be held not yet effective, and therefore
enforcement of it be without legal authorization, without such enforcement
being a violation of an injunction subjecting a federal official to contempt
proceedings.
Subsection 706(2) directs “the reviewing court”—that is, any reviewing
court—to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,” specifically defined to
include “the whole . . . of an agency rule, order, [etc.],”84 that the court finds
to be arbitrary or capricious, unconstitutional, in excess of statutory author-
ity, or otherwise unlawful.85  Subsection 706(2) thus appears to contemplate
that an unlawful agency rule or order, assuming its unlawfulness is more than
just a matter of its application to the plaintiff, will be set aside entirely.86  Nor
does § 706(2) direct courts to set aside the agency rule or order only within
the reviewing court’s own geographic territory.  One interpretation of this
provision is that Congress has expressed a policy judgment counter to perco-
lation.  Instead of allowing multiple court rulings and devising rules allowing
those decisions to coexist until the Supreme Court weighs in, Congress has
directed that an agency rule or policy be vacated in its entirety as soon as one
court decides that it should be.87  Another interpretation, however, is that
84 Id. §§ 551(13), 706(2).
85 Id. § 706(2).
86 See, e.g., Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 913 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (explaining that when a single judge “invalidate[s]” an agency rule, a single plain-
tiff injured by the rule effectively achieves relief for all similarly situated nonparties); Nat’l
Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (conclud-
ing that Justice Blackmun’s view on this point was representative of “all nine Justices”;
“[w]hen a reviewing court determines that agency regulations are unlawful, the ordinary
result is that the rules are vacated—not that their application to the individual petitioners
is proscribed” (quoting Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 495 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
The D.C. Circuit applies a two-part test to determine whether vacatur of a rule is
appropriate in cases where it remands to the agency to fix a flawed rule.  Allied-Signal, Inc.
v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 150–51 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (considering
“the seriousness of the order’s deficiencies (and thus the extent of doubt whether the
agency chose correctly) and the disruptive consequences of an interim change” (quoting
Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 920 F.2d 960, 967
(D.C. Cir. 1990)); see also, e.g., North Carolina v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 531 F.3d 896, 929
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (vacating interstate air pollution rule in its entirety under
this test), amended on reh’g by 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (remanding to
EPA without vacatur after concluding that rule was too fully entwined with the regulatory
regime); 33 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 8382.
87 See Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 699 (9th Cir. 2007). But see
ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 2013–6: REMAND WITHOUT VACATUR 2
(2013), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Remand%20Without%20Va
catur%20_%20Final%20Recommendation.pdf (“[N]o cases were identified in which a fed-
eral court of appeals held that remand without vacatur was unlawful under the APA . . . .
Rather, courts generally accept the remedy as a lawful exercise of equitable remedial dis-
cretion.”); Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in
Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291, 310 (2003) (contending that “set aside” command of
§ 706(2) does not overcome the “longstanding judicial presumption that militates against a
finding that Congress has placed curbs on the courts’ remedial discretion”).
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executive agencies and officials may continue relitigating the validity of the
vacated action in other circuits until the Supreme Court declares it vacated
nationwide.88
To the extent the APA requires a particular judicial remedy, assuming
that requirement to be constitutional, courts should not ignore that require-
ment based on policy preferences or prudential concerns.  However, I read
§ 706(2) at most to require nationwide vacatur,89 not a nationwide injunc-
tion.90  The discretion of courts sitting in equity should not be presumed to
be restricted unless Congress has spoken clearly.91  The APA does not clearly
state that a court that finds an agency action unlawful must enjoin all federal
officers from acting in accordance with that agency action, nationwide, on
penalty of contempt.
IV. PROBLEMS
Commentators have recognized numerous problems with nationwide
injunctions, including forum shopping, a risk of conflicting injunctions, an
impediment to percolation of legal questions through multiple lower courts,
tension with the restrictions on class actions, tension with the government’s
exemption from offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel, the politicizing of
the judiciary, and the enormous power wielded by a single judge.  I focus
here on two problems that I find particularly significant.
A. Impeding Percolation
As stated by Justice Ginsburg, “when frontier legal problems are
presented, periods of ‘percolation’ in, and diverse opinions from, state and
federal appellate courts may yield a better informed and more enduring final
88 See Vestal, supra note 24 (finding in a comprehensive survey of federal law no legal R
barrier to such relitigation).
89 I am doubtful that it does even that. See Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2120–26 (2017).  For an example of a court not vacating a rule,
despite finding it unlawful, outside the Allied-Signal context of curable deformities, see
Baeder v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 547, 553 (3d Cir. 1985).
90 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2018), by contrast, uses language that more clearly refers to an
injunction: “The reviewing court shall . . . compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed.” See also South Carolina v. United States, 907 F.3d 742, 760 (4th Cir.
2018) (reading this interpretation in the “plain language of § 706(1)”); Vietnam Veterans
of Am. v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 811 F.3d 1068, 1081 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding “[t]he
word ‘shall’ requires a court to compel agency action” in reviewing an injunction). But see
Org. for Competitive Mkts. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 912 F.3d 455, 462 n.5 (8th Cir. 2018)
(expressing “serious doubt” about whether “Congress in § 706(1) intended to foreclose all
discretion that is inherent in the judiciary’s equity jurisdiction”).  Yet I would not read
§ 706(1) to require a court to compel agency action where the lawfulness of the inaction or
delay is beyond the scope of the case or controversy that the court is deciding.  In other
words, I would still subject a § 706(1) injunction to the analysis I otherwise articulate in this
Article, particularly in Section III.A above.
91 United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 496 (2001).
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pronouncement by [the Supreme] Court.”92  The Supreme Court depends
on the development of intercircuit conflicts to identify legal issues that merit
its attention, as well as to help it decide those issues by offering an array of
well-considered judicial perspectives.
Circuit courts also benefit from multiple judicial decisions involving the
same legal questions.  Multiple district court opinions reaching contrary
results may help inform us of the full array of perspectives and arguments.
Multiple district court opinions reaching the same result may help indicate
that a particular position is worthy of adoption as circuit precedent.  Multiple
circuit court opinions in conflict or agreement have similar effects, inform-
ing our judgment whether we are considering a position as a matter of first
impression or considering overruling a position on which other circuits disa-
gree with us.
In the case of a correct but publicly controversial result, multiple courts
reaching that same result help ensconce that result in the law and give it
more legitimacy vis-a`-vis the public and elected officials.  If the result of a case
is subject to significant reasonable disagreement, multiple courts reaching
varying results create laboratories testing the different results’ effects and
ultimately help produce better decisions by subsequent courts.
Based on my experience as a federal judge, I believe that these virtues of
percolation typically outweigh the virtues of rapidly compelled uniformity.
When the federal government believes otherwise, it can conform its practice
nationwide on a voluntary basis to the extent that different decisions do not
impose conflicting mandates, or else it can seek Supreme Court review.
Nationwide injunctions do not always prevent percolation,93 but they
typically do.  A nationwide injunction typically prevents the challenged gov-
ernment action such that it can no longer give rise to additional challenges.
Although contemporaneously pending challenges may still reach decisions,94
plaintiffs are unlikely to expend resources litigating a challenge to a federal
policy that has already been enjoined nationwide.  Plaintiffs may lack stand-
ing to do so, and their challenges may be considered moot.95
Thus, nationwide injunctions represent a considerable disruption to the
ordinary rules of percolation supported by the nonprecedential effect of dis-
92 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
93 See, e.g., California v. Health & Human Servs., 351 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1299–1301
(N.D. Cal.) (injunction limited to state plaintiffs), aff’d, 941 F.3d 410, 421–23 (9th Cir.
2019) (not moot despite nationwide injunction issued by E.D. Pa.), petition for cert. filed, No.
19-1038 (Feb. 19, 2020).
94 See, e.g., Stockman v. Trump, No. EDCV 17-1799, 2017 WL 9732572 (C.D. Cal. Dec.
22, 2017); Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297, 2017 WL 6311305 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11,
2017); Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747 (D. Md. 2017); Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp.
3d 167 (D.D.C. 2017), vacated sub nom. Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 755 F. App’x 19 (D.C. Cir.
2019).  All four of these nationwide injunctions pertained to the same executive order
regarding transgender persons in the military.
95 These conclusions are not foregone, however, particularly to the extent that a
nationwide injunction is only preliminary (including temporary restraining orders and
interlocutory All Writs Act injunctions), or still subject to appeal or petition for certiorari.
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trict court decisions, the availability of circuit splits, and Mendoza’s exemption
of the federal government from offensive nonmutual preclusion.  This dis-
ruption should be avoided unless clearly justified.
B. Organizational Plaintiffs
Although I endorse the complete relief theory as to the typical individ-
ual plaintiff,96 I am less convinced of the propriety of a nationwide injunc-
tion styled to provide complete relief to an organizational plaintiff whose
members are only indirectly affected by the challenged order.97  Imagine a
pro bono immigration-legal-services organization that sues to enjoin an
immigration order.98  The organization asserts standing based on the alleged
injury to their use of resources to represent affected immigrants.  The organi-
zation asserts irreparable harm based on the unavailability of monetary dam-
ages in Administrative Procedure Act challenges.  The organization further
asserts that it represents immigrants across the country.  Assuming likeli-
hood, or even a final determination, of success on the merits, should the
district court issue a nationwide injunction?99
I am not sure that either standing considerations or equitable considera-
tions fairly support it.  As to standing,100 the principle that troubles me the
most is that standing should be limited to plaintiffs falling within the “zone of
96 See supra Part II.
97 I leave aside state plaintiffs, who straddle a middle ground in my view between indi-
vidual plaintiffs and other organizational plaintiffs, and who are subject to unique standing
standards.  For an example of a nationwide injunction issued on the basis of providing
“complete relief” to states, see Pennsylvania v. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d 791, 830–35 (E.D. Pa.
2019), aff’d sub nom., 930 F.3d 543 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 918 (2020)
(mem.).  For scholarly commentary on this subject, see Bradford Mank & Michael E.
Solimine, State Standing and National Injunctions, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1955 (2019);
Jonathan Remy Nash, State Standing for Nationwide Injunctions Against the Federal Government,
94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1985 (2019).
98 My hypothetical here is broadly abstracted from East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr,
934 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2019).
99 Professor Bray’s proposed restriction on nationwide injunctions—grant relief only
as to the plaintiff—does not provide a satisfactory constraint here if we seek to narrow the
scope. See Bray, supra note 2.  Would the government be prohibited from enforcing the
immigration rule only against those immigrants who might seek legal services from the
plaintiff?  Such an injunction might well be a de facto nationwide injunction.  Would the
court be unable to provide any remedy since the policy is not being enforced “against” the
plaintiff organization?  That result seems unfair unless we ground it in other considera-
tions of equity.
100 The standing doctrine is a limit on the judiciary’s power grounded in Article III’s
case-or-controversy requirement.  “[T]he ‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of standing
consists of three elements.  The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is
fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547
(2016) (citation omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61
(1992)).
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interests” of the statute conferring the right of action.101  Although under
current law the zone-of-interests test is limited to statutory interpretation
regarding legislatively conferred causes of action, I believe its former “pru-
dential” label speaks to important broader concerns.102
For example, in a lawsuit alleging a constitutional deficiency in an exec-
utive policy, I am skeptical that a plaintiff whose own injury is not a depriva-
tion or burdening of the relevant constitutional right should have standing to
assert the challenge.  If, in my above hypothetical, it is the immigrants’ consti-
tutional rights that are in dispute, I doubt that a case or controversy may be
concretely presented without the appearance of at least one such immigrant
before the court.  The existing caselaw liberally treats economic injury as suf-
ficient for purposes of standing, but I wonder whether this broad-brush
approach—especially where nationwide injunctions may foreclose further lit-
igation—deprives courts of the opportunity to make their decisions in the
context of real facts about real constitutional injuries.
Similar concerns can be expressed in terms of equitable considerations.
For instance, the theory under which my hypothetical legal organization is
able to assert irreparable injury103 creates a bit of a catch-22 for the govern-
ment.  Either assert sovereign immunity as to damages, only to get saddled
with injunctions based on purely economic harm, or give up sovereign immu-
nity as to damages.  Of course, Congress could reassert sovereign immunity
against injunctive relief, but there are multiple reasons why it may prefer not
to do so.  Congress could specifically assert sovereign immunity to injunctive
relief premised on irreparable harm itself traceable to sovereign immunity.
But this patch might be both over- and underinclusive.
Although I believe this concern regarding purely economic harm and
the government’s catch-22 is relevant to a court’s equitable discretion, I am
not convinced that incompatibility with the concept of irreparable harm is
the precise problem.  An economic loss of resources may be irreparable in a
literal sense.  Rather, what drives my concern with this phenomenon is a
sense of the balance of the equities.  Economic harm only indirectly attribu-
table to a challenged executive action simply does not seem commensurate
with the executive’s interest in being able to continue to defend its policies
before other courts, or with federal officials’ interests in being able to con-
duct their affairs free of the threat of contempt proceedings.
It would be one thing if the economic harm were a result of individual-
ized enforcement against the organization, in which case the balance of equi-
ties would likely favor at least an injunction specifically protecting the
organization.  But it is quite another where the harm is so indirect that com-
101 See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 (2014).
102 The zone-of-interests test used to be considered a matter of “prudential standing,”
but is now officially considered a matter of statutory interpretation regarding legislatively
conferred causes of action. Id.
103 For one articulation of this theory, see California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 581 (9th Cir.
2018).
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plete relief can only be provided with a nationwide injunction.  In the latter
case, the equities start to tip the other way.
The case of the indirectly harmed organizational plaintiff104 thus
nuances my embrace of the complete relief justification for nationwide
injunctions.  In such cases, I think complete relief ought to be particularly
unlikely to be justified under a proper exercise of equitable discretion, and
perhaps out of reach on standing grounds altogether.
V. REFORMS
A. Three-Judge District Courts
One obvious reform option to counter the growing trend of single dis-
trict court judges striking down national policies is to limit the issuance of
nationwide injunctions to three-judge district courts.  Congress has tried this
before in similar circumstances, and the intervention largely failed.  For the
same reasons the three-judge district court system was problematic then, I
would not recommend it now.
For much of the twentieth century, Congress subjected an evolving cate-
gory of federal injunction cases to initial hearing by a specially constituted
three-judge district court whose decision was directly appealable to the
Supreme Court.105  The evolving category was initially limited to interlocu-
tory injunctions sought against enforcement of state statutes by state officers
on the ground of unconstitutionality—a reaction to Ex parte Young.106  It
eventually grew to encompass all injunctions sought against enforcement of
state statutes, state administrative orders, and federal statutes on grounds of
unconstitutionality.  It never reached injunctions sought against federal
administrative orders, nor challenges brought solely on the basis of statutory
noncompliance (like Administrative Procedure Act challenges).
The perceived ill was the invalidation of a statute or administrative order
by a single unelected district court judge.  The attempted remedy was to
require at least two judges to agree to the initial invalidation, and to provide
for rapid, guaranteed review by the Supreme Court.  What the remedy-
crafters failed to foresee was (1) the significant burden this system placed on
the federal judiciary, and (2) the impediment this system would create
against the percolation of federal law.  The Supreme Court responded to
these problems by narrowing, as much as possible, both the statutory trigger
for the three-judge district court107 and the precedential effect of the Court’s
104 Organizational plaintiffs whose members are directly affected by a challenged federal
policy present a different situation than that which I have considered in this Section, much
more akin to that of the individual described in Part II above.
105 See generally 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 4234.
106 209 U.S. 123, 150–52 (1908) (establishing the power of the federal courts to enforce
the Constitution against state officers, notwithstanding the state’s immunity to suit under
the Eleventh Amendment).
107 See Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251 (1941) (holding that the three-judge
court statute is “not . . . a measure of broad social policy to be construed with great liberal-
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-5\NDL506.txt unknown Seq: 24 10-JUN-20 15:11
2036 notre dame law review [vol. 95:5
summary affirmances of three-judge district court decisions.108  Congress vir-
tually abolished the procedure in 1976.109
The same problems would plague a system requiring three-judge district
courts to adjudicate all complaints requesting nationwide injunctions.  The
right of direct appeal would impede percolation even more than the current
nationwide injunction practice does by immediately entrenching results in
Supreme Court precedent.  Absent a right of direct appeal, a potential small
gain in legitimacy would come at the cost of a significant burdening of the
judiciary.  Accordingly, I do not believe that Congress should reemploy this
approach.
B. Scope Hearings
By contrast, I support calls for the procedural reform of requiring a spe-
cial hearing regarding the appropriate scope of a potential nationwide
injunction.110  A district court should give full consideration to the costs and
benefits of enjoining the federal government from enforcing or implement-
ing a particular policy writ large.  Moreover, it should fully explain its reason-
ing regarding the scope of the injunction in writing.  It would help if the
parties were directed to brief the appropriate scope of the injunction after
the court has issued its substantive decision.111  Accordingly, if the govern-
ment loses, it would have an opportunity to present arguments regarding the
appropriate scope of any injunction in light of the specific findings and con-
clusions reached by the district judge.
The written decision following such a hearing would be of great assis-
tance to a reviewing court.  We appellate judges are not generally in the busi-
ness of crafting injunctions, and we do not have the benefit of district courts’
experience enforcing injunctions over time to observe their workability and
consequences.  More thorough explanations of a district court’s reasoning
would help us evaluate challenges to the scope of an injunction.
We are, however, in the business of establishing precedential doctrine
for our respective circuits that governs district courts’ exercise of their equita-
ble powers in general.  I note that some of the downsides of nationwide
injunctions—the incentive to forum shop, for instance—are better suited for
ity, but . . . an enactment technical in the strict sense of the term and to be applied as
such”).
108 See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 784 n.5 (1983) (“We have often recog-
nized that ‘the precedential effect of a summary affirmance extends no further than “the
precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions.”  A summary disposition
affirms only the judgment of the court below, and no more may be read into our action
than was essential to sustain the judgment.’” (quoting Ill. Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Work-
ers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 182–83 (1979))).
109 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 4234.  The three-judge district court lives on in
the context of certain voting rights and elections cases.
110 See, e.g., Frost, supra note 2, at 1116.
111 This is admittedly more practical in the context of a permanent injunction than a
preliminary injunction, temporary restraining order, or other emergency order.
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appellate consideration (or congressional consideration) than for an individ-
ual district judge’s hearing on the appropriate scope of an injunction in a
particular case.  It is the availability of nationwide injunctions in general that
encourages forum shopping—once a district court judge is ruling on a par-
ticular motion for nationwide injunction, the forum has already been
shopped.  Concerns regarding macroeffects on the judiciary and on litigation
practice—including forum shopping, the impediment to percolation, the
politicizing of the judiciary, and the enormous power wielded by a single
judge—are concerns that should inform whether and how strictly the judici-
ary and/or Congress create new categorically applicable rules to prevent or
limit the issuance of nationwide injunctions.  They are not concerns that an
individual district court judge should be expected to weigh in an individual
case against issuance of a specific nationwide injunction.
C. Substantive Limits
I also believe that certain stricter substantive limits are in order.  As I
have already articulated my rationale for each specific limit above, I merely
collect my proposals here in summary and make them explicit.
First, I would strengthen the principle that injunctive relief should be
narrowly tailored to the irreparable harm that will befall the plaintiff.112  As a
corollary, I would expressly abrogate a court’s equitable discretion to issue
injunctive relief to the extent that relief is purely protective of similarly situ-
ated nonparties (absent class certification),113 or purely prohibitive of the
defendants’ generalized violation of the law.114
Second, I would interpret the Administrative Procedure Act to impose
no constraint on a court’s equitable discretion not to issue a nationwide
injunction.115
Third, I would expressly limit the scope of parts three and four of the
preliminary injunctions test.116  I would limit the equities to be balanced to
those of the actual parties, and I would limit consideration of the public
interest to the question of whether it negates the propriety of injunctive relief
(as opposed to whether it supports it).117  Although it may sound heartless to
112 See supra Part III.
113 See supra Section III.A.
114 See supra Section III.B.
115 See supra Section III.C.
116 Preliminary injunctions (as well as temporary restraining orders and interlocutory
stays or injunctions under the All Writs Act) differ from permanent injunctions in a signifi-
cant way: the district court has not actually determined that the law or policy is invalid.  In
this context, the district court judge is invited to place much more weight on his or her
own public policy preferences.  (They also differ, however, in that the district court has less
time and a more limited record on which to reach a decision, which may justifiably make
the district court more wary of allowing irreparable harm to occur.)
117 These suggestions seem to be required by Supreme Court precedent anyway with
regard to permanent injunctions. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391
(2006) (describing the third and fourth permanent injunction elements that a plaintiff
must demonstrate as “(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-5\NDL506.txt unknown Seq: 26 10-JUN-20 15:11
2038 notre dame law review [vol. 95:5
disregard the public interest, this assessment is highly subjective and perhaps
the factor most likely to invite a judge to play a purely political role.
CONCLUSION
Nationwide injunctions are justified when their nationwide scope is inci-
dental to the provision of complete relief to a deserving plaintiff.  They are
not justified when they represent an end-run around class-action require-
ments for the protection of nonparties or when their scope is tied only to the
scope of the challenged policy without relation to the plaintiff’s injuries.
Even allowing for occasional justification, nationwide injunctions freight the
system with significant costs for judicial legitimacy and for the development
of the law.  Accordingly, I join those voices calling for reforms that would
limit the practice.  Nationwide injunctions should issue only where fully
justified.
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
disserved by a permanent injunction”—i.e., whether the public interest would be served by
an injunction is irrelevant (emphasis added)).  Arguably, however, they do not reflect the
law on preliminary injunctions. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20
(2008) (describing the third and fourth preliminary injunction elements that a plaintiff
must establish as “that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in
the public interest”).
